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really put ourselves inside the object of consciousness; it is no longer relative, but absolute.

This, then, must be the type of the knowledge at which metaphysics aims; there would be no such study as metaphysics unless we could put ourselves inside all reality in the same kind of way as we are aware of our own minds from inside. Bergson thinks that we can do this, because all reality is,—though not to the same extent as our own minds,—a mobile process characterized by what he calls *durée*. There is, in short, a peculiar act (intuition) specially adapted to grasp a peculiar object (*durée*), and while in self-consciousness this object is grasped in perfection, with practice the philosopher will attain to intuitive knowledge of the external world as well.

Leaving aside the thousand difficulties raised by this theory, I have only space to indicate here what seems to be its fundamental fallacy. Everything depends on the following argument. No whole is merely the sum of its parts; therefore no whole has any real parts. But whenever we think about wholes, we think of them as composed of parts, and indeed all thinking involves a perception of relations between parts. Therefore, in thinking we never grasp the true nature of reality, which is only given in the simple intuition of wholes. To refute this reasoning, it seems sufficient to observe that, from the premise that no whole is merely the sum of its parts, the conclusion that no whole is composed of parts,—that there are no real parts at all,—does not follow.

London, England.

SYDNEY WATERLOW.

A NEW PHILOSOPHY: HENRI BERGSON. By Edouard Le Roy. Translated by Vincent Brown, M. A. London: Williams & Norgate, 1913. Pp. viii, 235.

The new philosophy of M. Henri Bergson has recently become so widely known that a very distinct need has begun to be felt for some form of commentary upon it which shall help to make the general outlines clear to those who either have not yet faced the original, or else have found themselves too much overwhelmed by its eloquent persuasiveness to submit it to honest examination.

M. Le Roy has undertaken in the present book to supply this want. The way he has dealt with his subject is admirably suited to his purpose. He does not attempt to say too much. The

book falls roughly into three parts, the first two dealing with the method and the main results to which it has led, while in the third, in a series of notes added at the end, the various main notions involved in M. Bergson's philosophy are explained rather more fully than was possible in the previous part. Here, then, we get a clear and concise statement of the main features of M. Bergson's philosophy, with little comment and no criticism, for these fall outside the plan of the book. In any case, however, it is clear that M. Le Roy finds himself so much in sympathy with the views he is stating that on the fundamental points very little criticism would seem to him required. It is this very sympathy in essentials, in the case of a philosopher who has never himself been a pupil of Bergson's, but has arrived independently at his own conclusions, that makes his statement of the case so valuable. We get the advantage of two original presentations of the same case; if one way failed to bring home to us its real meaning, the other may sometimes have a happier inspiration, and suddenly we understand.

M. Le Roy rightly claims that the most original and essential thing in Bergson's philosophy is his new method of thought. Critics completely misunderstanding him sometimes accuse him of discrediting all use of the reason and preaching a return to effortless immediacy.

Perhaps the most valuable thing in M. Le Roy's book is the clear way in which he explains the precise nature of M. Bergson's method. Once having grasped this, the results to which it has so far led are much easier to follow. The brief sketch of these, which forms the second part, is very valuable in showing clearly the connection between Bergson's various theories, and enabling us to survey his work as a whole. It is not possible for M. Le Roy to treat any particular point in much detail, but in the case of steps of fundamental importance he indicates the line the proof follows, without working it out.

From this sketch he passes on to the future results which may be expected to follow from the application of this same new method in other fields. M. Bergson's work is by no means completed: there are still many philosophical subjects on which he has not touched. About ethics he has as yet written nothing.

M. Le Roy however does not consider this new philosophy in any way incompatible with religion: he even holds that the application of its method might well produce evidence strongly

in support of such belief. But on this question he allows himself only a few words. Having undertaken to give only M. Bergson's own views, he feels he has no right to lay stress on a subject on which M. Bergson has not yet written.

As a sympathetic commentary on this new philosophy M. Le Roy's book is admirable, but it suffers inevitably from the very thing which makes its value. For those who already sympathize, at least in part, with M. Bergson's views, it adds fresh insight, and the meaning is clear. It is likely, however, to strike less favorably those who have not yet accustomed their minds to the new point of view. If they look for a perfectly clear cut use of terms according to rigidly fixed definitions, they will be disappointed (and in that case probably disgusted also). Perhaps this is inevitable. The claim of this new method of thought to supersede the formal use of concepts in favor of language, which creates new ones to express new intuitions as it goes, is the very thing its opponents are least ready to admit.

Over one very important point, however, critics would have a right to complain. M. Le Roy does not give anywhere in this book a satisfactory account of M. Bergson's theory of Time. The question of Time is so fundamental that its omission must certainly be admitted to be a serious defect in a book otherwise deserving nothing but praise.

London, England.

KARIN COSTELLOE.

THE PROBLEM OF TRUTH. By H. Wilson Carr, D.Litt. London and Edinburgh: T. C. & E. C. Jack, 1913. Pp. 93. The People's Books Series.

This little book is the second contributed by Mr. Carr to the series called 'The People's Books.' It is meant to convey to non-specialists some idea of the problems of epistemology, and in this I think it should succeed; though it is a little difficult to be sure whether what is quite intelligible to one who is familiar with these questions will be equally clear to those who are now meeting them for the first time.

Mr. Carr takes over Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description and says that the problem of truth and error only concerns the latter. This is rather too sweeping. The problem applies to all propositions, and the fact that when a proposition is founded purely on knowl-